Introduction
We consider economic environments where a set of indivisible identical objects have to be assigned to a set of individuals with single-peaked preferences. As an example, take the assignment o f t h e n umber of courses a professor in an economics department has to teach. Each professor has a number of courses he nds optimal (probably somewhere betwe e n 0 t o 4) and preferences are decreasing when moving away from that optimal amount in either direction. If we are interested in \fair allocations", for instance allocations that respect equal treatment of equals (if two individuals have the same preference relation, then they should beindi erent between each other's allotments), then the indivisibility assumption may induce an impossibility. For simplicity, assume that we h a ve to assign a course and none of the professors in the department wants to teach it. Obviously there is no deterministic way to do so that respects equal treatment of equals. However, allowing the rule to be probabilistic solves our problem at least in an ex-ante sense: if each professor has to teach the course with equal probability, t h e n equal treatment of equals is satis ed (ex-ante).
The probabilistic allocation or rationing of indivisible objects has received recent attention. Two main models should be distinguished. In the rst one there are n objects and n agents and each agent receives exactly one object. Any two objects are distinct and each agent has a strict preference relation over the set of objects. For example, the agents are workers and each object is a full-time job at a di erent company. The random assignment of the objects to the agents is the subject of papers by Abdulkadiro glu and S onmez (1998, 2000) , Bogomolnaia and Moulin (1999) , and Cr es and Moulin (1998) .
In the second model there are k identical indivisible objects and n agents. Each agent receives a certain number of objects and each object is assigned to some agent (free disposal is not allowed). For instance, the objects are identical (non full-time) jobs that have t o be allocated among workers. This model is studied by Moulin (2000) , Moulin and Stong (2000) , Sasaki (1997) , and Kureishi (2000) . In the rst two papers each agent demands a certain numberof objects and the total demand is greater than the numberof objects available. In the last two papers each agent has a single-peaked preference relation over the number of objects he may receive. That is, there is a most preferred number of objects, called the agent's peak, and preferences are strictly decreasing in either direction away from the peak. A probabilistic rule chooses for each pro le of preferences a probability distribution over the set of allocations. The interpretation is that the nal allocation that we implement i s drawn according to this distribution. An agent compares two distributions over the set of allocations by e v aluating the marginal distributions that are induced over his allotments.
We consider the same model as Sasaki (1997) and Kureishi (2000) , but we do not only consider preferences that can be represented by von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. First, we use the ordinal extension of preferences over allotments to probability distributions over allotments. An agent prefers a distribution over his allotments to another if the rst distribution places on each w eak upper contour set at least the same probability that is placed on it by the second distribution. The ordinal extension of preferences is incomplete over the set of distributions. However, it is equivalent to the following. If an agent prefers one distribution to another, then for each utility representation of his preference relation the expected utility with respect to the distribution is greater than or equal to the expected utility of the second one. 1 Using this extension we formulate the requirements of Pareto e ciency, strategy-proofness (no agent can gain by misrepresenting his preference relation), and no-envy (each agent prefers his marginal distribution to each other agent's marginal distribution). Contrary to the model with distinct objects (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 1999) it turns out that in our model Pareto e ciency is equivalent to ex-post e ciency. Using the uniform rule (Benassy, 1982) , where k units of an in nitely divisible commodity are rationed as equally as possible, we de ne uniform probabilistic rules (Sasaki, 1997) in terms of their \uniform marginal distributions". 2 We call a probabilistic rule a uniform probabilistic rule if for each pro le the marginals of the chosen distribution are equal to the uniform marginal distributions at this pro le. Our main result is that the class of uniform probabilistic rules is characterized by Pareto e ciency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. This result is the probabilistic analogue to the result of Sprumont (1991) . He shows that when rationing k units of an in nitely divisible commodity among a set of individuals with single-peaked preferences, the uniform rule is the only deterministic rule satisfying the above combination of properties. Sprumont's characterization remains valid if we replace no-envy by anonymity (Sprumont, 1991) or equal treatment of equals (Ching, 1994) . However, in our probabilistic setting this conclusion is not true. For example, any random dictatorship rule satis es Pareto e ciency, strategy-proofness, and anonymity. It is an open question what the class of probabilistic rules satisfying these properties looks like.
1
A considerable number of papers considers the ordinal extension of preferences, e.g., Abdulkadiro glu and S onmez (2000), Bogomolnaia and Moulin (1999) , Ehlers (1998) , Ehlers and Klaus (2001) , Ehlers, Peters, and Storcken (2000) , and Gibbard (1977) .
In two related papers (Sasaki, 1997 Kureishi, 2000 agents are assumed to be strictly risk averse von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizer, i.e., e a c h agent e v aluates distributions on the basis of the expected utility relative to his utility function. They show that for a given pro le of utility functions, if a distribution is Pareto e cient, then each agent's marginal distribution places probability 1 on two allotments that di er only by one unit. Using this observation we show that then, the problem can bereduced to the problem of allocating k units of an in nitely divisible commodity among n agents with single-peaked preferences over 0 k ]. Then we apply the characterization of the (deterministic) uniform rule by Ching (1994) and show that in the probabilistic model with strictly risk averse agents, the class of uniform probabilistic rules is characterized by Pareto e ciency, strategy-proofness, and equal treatment of equals. Therefore, the results of Sasaki (1997) and Kureishi (2000) can beinterpreted as corollaries of Ching (1994) .
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and basic properties. In Section 3 we de ne the class of uniform probabilistic rules and present our main result. In Section 4 we p r o ve the characterization. Finally, in Section 5 we f o c u s on strictly risk averse agents with von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.
The Model and Basic Properties
We consider the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents N = f1 : : : n g. Each agent i 2 N is equipped with a \single-peaked" preference relation R i de ned over the number of objects he receives i.e., R i is de ned over K f 0 1 : : : k g and there exists a numberofobjects p(R i ) 2 K, called the peak of R i , with the following property: for all x i y i 2 K, i f x i < y i p(R i ) or x i > y i p(R i ), then y i P i x i . As usual, x i R i y i means \x i is weakly preferred to y i ", and x i P i y i means \x i is strictly preferred to y i ". By R we denote the class of all single-peaked preference relations over K. By R N we denote the set of all (preference) pro les R = ( R i ) i2N such that for all i 2 N, R i 2 R .
We We extend the original analysis of deterministic rules by considering \probabilistic" rules. A probabilistic (allocation) rule ' is a function that selects for every R 2 R N a (probability) distribution over the set of feasible allocations X, denoted by '(R). Given For each a g e n t i 2 N, l e t ' i (R) denote the marginal distribution induced by '(R) o ver his allotments in K. Each agent i 2 N only cares about his marginal distribution ' i (R) o n K. A deterministic rule is a probabilistic rule that selects for every R 2 R N a distribution placing probability 1 on a single allocation in X.
The following example demonstrates that two distributions having the same marginal distributions need not be equal. Remark 1 Let Q beadistribution on X. Then, P n i=1 P k x i =0 Q i (x i )x i = k. Equivalently to P n i=1 P k x i =0 Q i (x i )x i we also use the notation R X x i dQ i .
We extend preferences on agents' allotments in K to marginal distributions on K. Our extension is based on the concept of weak upper contour sets. Given x i 2 K and R i 2 R, the weak upper contour set of x i at R i is de ned as B(x i R i ) fy i 2 K j y i R i x i g. Given a preference relation R i 2 R and two marginal distributions Q i Q 0 i on K, a g e n t i weakly prefers Q i to Q 0 i , i f Q i assigns to each w eak upper contour set at least the probability that is assigned to this set by Q 0 i . For notational convenience we use the same symbolsR i and P i to de ne preferences over marginal distributions.
Ordinal Extension of Preferences: For all R i 2 R and all marginal distributions 
Inequality (1) is a rst order stochastic dominance condition in particular it requires that the marginal distributions Q i and Q 0 i are comparable in that respect. Therefore, our extension is not complete on the set of all marginal distributions on K.
Our extension of preferences is equivalent to the following. Assume that each agent's preference relation over lotteries can be represented by a utility function in the sense that it can be used to compare two marginal distributions via the expected utilities relative to this representation. Then (1) is equivalent t o the fact that the expected utility relative t o any utility function representing R i is at Q greater or equal than at Q 0 . Thus, regardless which u t i l i t y function represents an agent's preference relation, he will weakly prefer Q to Q 0 . For a further discussion of utility representation of preferences we refer to Section 5. We are interested in Pareto e ciency. Following the de nition of Pareto e ciency for deterministic rules, a probabilistic rule is Pareto e cient if it only assigns \Pareto e cient distributions on X" i.e., a distribution assigned by the probabilistic rule cannot be changed in such a w ay that no agent is worse o and some agent is better o . Remark 2 (Same-Sidedness) A deterministic rule satis es Pareto e ciency if and only if satis es same-sidedness i.e., f o r a l l R 2 R N ,
A similar result holds for probabilistic rules: ex-post e ciency is equivalent to samesidedness. Given x i y i 2 K such t h a t x i y i , l e t x i y i ] f x i x i + 1 : : : y i g.
Lemma 1 (Pareto E ciency) A probabilistic rule ' satis es Pareto e ciency if and only if it satis es same-sidedness i.e., for all R 2 R N ,
Proof. It is straightforward to show t h a t i f ' satis es Pareto e ciency, then (i) and (ii) hold. To show the converse, suppose ' satis es same-sidedness. Suppose that ' violates Pareto e ciency for some R 2 R N . Thus, there exists a distribution Q over X such that for all i 2 N, Q i R i ' i (R) and for some j 2 N, Q j P j ' j (R). Without loss of generality, Conditions (i) and (ii) in Lemma 1 imply that an allocation chosen by the probabilistic rule ' satis es same-sidedness and therefore Pareto e ciency. Hence, Lemma 1 states that Pareto e ciency and ex-post Pareto e ciency are equivalent in our model. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (1999) show that this equivalence is not valid when assigning heterogenous indivisible objects to individuals.
Next we introduce strategy-proofness for probabilistic rules. By strategy-proofness no agent can ever bene t by misrepresenting his preference relation. In game theoretical terms, a rule satis es strategy-proofness if in its associated direct revelation game f o r m , i t i s a w eakly dominant strategy for each a g e n t to announce his true preference relation.
Note that our notion of strategy-proofness also requires that the marginal distributions that are assigned by the probabilistic rule before and after any unilateral deviation are comparable.
By anonymity the names of the agents do not matter. More precisely, an anonymous probabilistic rule is symmetric in its arguments.
Let N be the class of all permutations on N. Then for all R 2 R N and all 2 N , b y R we m e a n ( R (i) ) i2N .
Anonymity: For all R 2 R N , a l l 2 N , and all i 2 N, ' (i) 
No-envy states that no agent strictly prefers the marginal distribution of another agent to his own.
No-Envy: For all R 2 R N and all i j 2 N, ' i (R) R i ' j (R).
No-envy also requires that the agents' marginal distributions that are assigned by the probabilistic rule are comparable.
Equal treatment of equals, a weakening of no-envy and of anonymity, requires that if two a g e n ts have the same preference relations, then each of them is indi erent b e t ween his marginal distribution and the other agent's marginal distribution.
Equal Treatment of Equals: For all R 2 R N and all i j 2 N, if R i = R j , then
The Uniform Probabilistic Correspondence
In identifying probabilistic rules that satisfy a certain combination of properties, we will not be able to determine the exact distribution for each pro le. All requirements are formulated with respect to marginal distributions and as demonstrated in Example 1 those do not uniquely determine the original distribution. We will only beable to show that a probabilistic rule satis es a certain list of requirements if and only if for each pro le the marginal distributions are of a certain form. Therefore, we i n troduce correspondences that assign to each pro le a set of distributions.
The following \uniform correspondence" assigns to each pro le exactly the distributions that induce \uniform marginal distributions" on each a g e n t's allotments: for each pro le of peaks(p(R i )) i2N calculate the so-called uniform allocation for R. Denote this allocation bỹ U(R). Without loss of generality, suppose that R is in excess demand, i.e., P i2N p(R i ) > k (the de nition for the excess supply case is similar). Thus, for some 2 0 k ], we have that for all i 2 N,Ũ i (R) = m i n (p(R i ) ). For each agent we c hoose the following uniform marginal distribution f i (R) o ver his allotments. IfŨ i (R) = p(R i ), then f i (R) places probability 1 o n p(R i ). Otherwise, calculate x 2 f 0 1 : : : k g such t h a t belongs to the interval with endpoints x and x + 1 . Then calculate weights and (1 ) on the endpoints such that equals the convex combination of the two endpoints according to the weights, i.e., = x + ( 1 )(x + 1) where 2 0 1]. Then, the uniform marginal distribution f i (R) places probability on x and probability 1 on x + 1 .
Uniform Probabilistic Correspondence, U: Let R 2 R N and Q be a distribution over X. Then Q 2 U (R) if and only if the following holds. We s a y that a probabilistic rule ' is a uniform probabilistic rule if for all R 2 R N , '(R) 2 U(R). The following example of a probabilistic rule proves that the uniform correspondence is non-empty. Example 2 We de ne the uniform probabilistic rule U as follows (Sasaki, 1997 in de ning the uniform probabilistic rule U Moulin (2000) uses the same trick as we do 4 in de ning the correspondence U). Let R 2 R N .
(i) Excess Demand: P i2N p(R i ) > k .
Without loss of generality, let N = fi 2 N j p(R i ) x + 1 g = f1 : : : ng and N = fi 2 N j p(R i ) x g = f n + 1 : : : n g. Then we obtain U(R) a s f o l l o ws: in each allocation that occurs at U(R) with positive probability, e a c h a g e n t i ñ N receives his peakamount and each agent in N receives either x or x + 1 . Note that for each i 2 N, (x + 1 ) P i x and that exactly n( x ) agents in N can receive x + 1 .
We o b t a i n U(R) b y placing equal probability on all allocations where all agents inÑ receive their peak amounts, n( x ) a g e n ts in N receive x + 1, and the remaining agents in N receive x . Hence, U(R) is obtained by placing equal probabilities on exactly n n( x ) allocations. Note that
(ii) Balanced Demand:
(iii) Excess Supply:
Without loss of generality, l e t N = fi 2 N j p(R i ) x g = f1 : : : ng andÑ = fi 2 N j p(R i ) x + 1 g = f n + 1 : : : n g. Then we obtain U(R) as follows: in each allocation that occurs at U(R) with positive probability, each a g e n t i ñ N receives his peak amount and each agent in N receives either x or x + 1 . Note that for i 2 N, x P i (x + 1 ) and that exactly n n( x ) agents in N can receive x . In other words, n( x ) of agents in N will receive x + 1 . We obtain U(R) by placing equal probability on all allocations where all agents inÑ receive their peak amounts, n( x ) agents in N receive x +1, and the remaining agents in N receive x . Hence, U(R) is obtained by placing equal probabilities on exactly Our main result is that, similarly as in the deterministic setting (Sprumont, 1991 Ching, 1992 Ehlers, 2000 , Pareto e ciency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy determine \uniform allocations".
Theorem 1 Uniform probabilistic rules are the only probabilistic rules satisfying Pareto e ciency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy.
Remark 3 Theorem 1 is a tight c haracterization since we already know from the deterministic framework that all properties are logically independent (see Sprumont 1991 and Ching 1992) . However, in contrast to the deterministic framework, we cannot replace no-envy with anonymity or weaken it to equal treatment of equals (see Example 4).
Example 4 Let N = f1 2g and R 2 R N .
The probabilistic rule satis es Pareto e ciency, strategy-proofness, and anonymity. However, as we will demonstrate next, violates no-envy.
Let k = 5 , p(R 1 ) = 5 , p(R 2 ) = 1 and 5 P 2 0. Then, (R) = 1 2 (5 0) 1 2 (4 1)] and 2 (R)(B(5 R 2 )) = 1 2 < 1 = 1 (R)(B(5 R 2 )):
Thus, we d o n o t h a ve t h a t 2 (R) R 2 1 (R), which c o n tradicts no-envy more precisely, the comparability condition that is incorporated in no-envy is violated.
Example 4 can be easily extended to an arbitrary number of agents. More precisely, the rule is the random dictatorship rule for two agents. For an arbitrary numberofagents, the random dictatorship rule is Pareto e cient, strategy-proof, a n d anonymous. Note that all convex combinations of uniform probabilistic rules and the random dictatorship rule satisfy Pareto e ciency, strategy-proofness, a n d anonymity. It is an open question whether there are other probabilistic rules that satisfy this list of properties.
Proof of the Characterization
It is straightforward to check that each uniform probabilistic rule satis es Pareto e ciency, strategy-proofness, a n d no-envy. Conversely, l e t ' be a probabilistic rule satisfying Pareto e ciency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We have t o show t h a t f o r a l l R 2 R N , '(R) 2 U(R).
Pareto e ciency and Lemma 1 imply that if demand is balanced, then (ii) in the denition of U holds. In the remainder of this section we p r o ve that if R is in excess demand, then (i) in the de nition of U holds. The proof of (iii), i.e., excess supply, is similar.
Recall that for all x i y i 2 K such that x i y i , w e h a ve x i y i ] f x i x i + 1 : : : y i g.
Lemma 2 Let R 2 R N be such that P i2N p(R i ) > k . Then for all i 2 N,
Proof. Let i 2 N. We consider two cases. Case 1: p(R i ) x + 1 . We have to show that ' i (R)( x p (R i )]) = 1. Assume, by contradiction, that 
Thus,
Hence, by Pareto e ciency (PE), no-envy (NE), and the construction of R 0 i , for all j 6 = i, 1
Thus, for all j 2 N, )( x k ]): (7) By (7) and no-envy (NE), for all l 6 = j,
Thus, for all l 2 N, ' l (R By Pareto e ciency, ' j ( R)(p( R j )) = 1. Since p( R j ) 2 B(x R T 0 j ), it follows that ' j ( R)(B(x R T 0 j )) = 1. But this implies a contradiction because by strategy-proofness (SP), (4) was wrong and the statement for Case 1 is proven. 
Particularly, b e c a u s e p(R i ) x , f o r a l l j 2 N, 
Hence, (11) implies (a) i.e., i f p(R i ) x , then ' i (R) = U i (R). Next, we p r o ve ( b ) i.e., i f p(R i ) x + 1 , t h e n ' i (R) = U i (R). We consider two cases.
Case 1: For some j 2 N, R j 2 R is such that p(R j ) = x + 1, and for all x j 2 p(R j ) k ],
By Pareto e ciency (PE), no-envy (NE), and the structure of R j , for all i 2 N such that p(R i ) x + 1 ,
Similarly, for all i 2 N such that p(R i ) x + 1 ,
Hence, for all i 2 N such that p(R i ) x + 1 ,
Thus, by Lemma 2, for all i 2 N such that p(R i ) x + 1 ,
We consider two subcases. 
Recall that by Remark 1 and (a),
Recall that by the de nition of and x ,
Furthermore, note that for all i 2 N such t h a t p(R i ) = x + 1 ,
Using (15), (16), and (17), it follows that
This and (14) imply that for all i 2 N such that p(R i ) = x + 1 , ' i (R)(x + 1 ) = x . Thus, for all i 2 N such that p(R i ) = x + 1 , ' i (R)(x ) = 1 ( x ). This proves (b) i.e., i f p(R i ) x + 1, then ' i (R) = U i (R). This completes the proof for Case 1.1. For some l 2 N, p(R l ) x + 2 . If for all l 2 N such that p(R l ) x + 2 , ' l (R)( x + 2 k ]) = 0, then similarly as in Case 1.1 it follows that p(R l ) x + 1 implies ' l (R) = U l (R). Assume, by contradiction, that for some l 2 N such that p(R l ) x + 2 ,
Let R 0 l 2 R be such that R 0 l = R j and R 0 (R 0 l R l ). By Pareto e ciency (PE) and strategy-proofness (SP),
Suppose that for all i 2 N such t h a t p(R 
Consider pro le R 0 and recall from Case 1 that for all i 2 N 0
Hence, for all i 2 N 0 ,
Furthermore, for all i 2 N 0 ,
Since for all i 2 N such that p(R
In particular, by (18) and (19),
Hence, (26), (27), and (28) imply
By Remark 1,
Hence, Since N is nite and at each step the numberof agents having a peak greater than or equal to x + 2 is smaller, we nally get a contradiction. Therefore, (b) holds for Case 1 i.e., if p(R i ) x + 1 , then ' i (R) = U i (R).
Case 2: There exists no j 2 N such t h a t p(R j ) = x + 1o rf o rR j such t h a t p(R j ) = x + 1 there exists some x j 2 p(R j ) k ] s u c h t h a t B(x j R j ) 6 = p(R j ) x j ].
We have to show (b) i.e., if p(R i ) x + 1 , then ' i (R) = U i (R). First we show that for all i 2 N such t h a t p(R i ) x + 1 ,
Assume, by contradiction, that for some j 2 N such that p(R j ) x + 1 , ' j (R)(x ) 6 = U j (R)(x ). Consider R 0 j 2 R such that p(R 0 j ) = x + 1 , and for all x j 2 p(R 0 
Hence, by (30), (31), and (32), 5 Von-Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Functions
In this section we assume that agents have single-peaked preferences that satisfy the von Neuman Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility property i.e., for any preference relation R i Furthermore, we assume that all agents are strictly risk averse i.e., for all l 2 f 1 : : : k 1g,
Let V denote the class of all vNM-utility functions that exhibit strict risk aversion. Let V N denote the set of all (vNM-utility) pro les u = ( u i ) i2N such that for all i 2 N, u i 2 V .
Note that if a utility function exhibits strict risk aversion, then it is single-peaked. Given The following Lemma is due to Sasaki (1997) The only-if part of Lemma 4 follows from Lemma 3. We omit the proof of the if-part of Lemma 4. 6 Lemma 4 implies that any Pareto e cient allocation can be represented as a vector of nonnegative real numbers. Let Q be a distribution that is Pareto e cient for some u 2 V N .
Then Q can be represented as follows. According to Lemma 4, for all i 2 N there exists a number of objects a i 2 K such that G i (Q i ) f a i a i + 1 g. By i we denote the probability at Q i for agent i to receive a i . Thus, agent i receives a i + 1 a t Q i with probability 1 i . Using these unique probabilities, we can represent the distribution Q i by a unique number Note that we have P i2N q i = k. Thus, each distribution Q is identi ed with a unique allocation (q 1 : : : q n ) 2 0 k ] N of k units of an in nitely divisible commodity. LetD(X) denote the set of all distributions Q 2 D (X) such that for all i 2 N there exists some a i 2 K for which G i (Q i ) fa i a i + 1 g. Hence, a Pareto e cient probabilistic rule is a function ' : V N !D(X). Let X(N k ) denote the set of all allocations that are obtained via some distribution belonging toD(X), i.e., X(N k ) f (q 1 : : : q n ) j Q 2D(X)g. Obviously, X ( X(N k ). Therefore, a Pareto e cient rule ' essentially splits the amount k of a perfectly divisible good among the agents in N. Conversely, each vector (q 1 : : : q n ) 2 X(N k ) 6 The somewhat tedious proof of the if-part of Lemma 4 is available from the authors upon request. uniquely identi es marginal distributions Q i and a (non-unique) distribution Q 2D(X).
Note that single-peakedness on K implies single-peakedness on 0 k ] if agents consider assignments q i 2 0 k ] that correspond to marginal distributions Q i . Therefore, the problem of assigning k identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences by using a Pareto e cient probabilistic rule reduces to the problem of dividing the amount k of a perfectly divisible homogeneous commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences.
So, any Pareto e cient probabilistic rule ' : V N !D(X) induces a Pareto e cient deterministic allocation rule : R N ! X (N k ) for the problem of dividing the amount k of a perfectly divisible homogeneous commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. Furthermore, if the probabilistic rule also satis es strategy-proofness and noenvy, then the induced allocation rule satis es these properties as well. Any probabilistic rule with uniform marginal distributions induces the uniform allocation rule and vice versa. 7 The domain R satis es the following \richness condition": given x i y i 2 0 k ], if ]x i y i \K 6 = , then for all z i 2]x i y i \K there exist preference relations R i R i 2 R such that p(R i ) = p( R i ) = z i , x i P i y i , and y i P i x i . It can bechecked that for example for the proofs of Ching (1994) this condition su ces to show that if a deterministic rule : R N ! X(N k ) satis es same-sidedness, strategy-proofness, and equal treatment of equals, then it is the uniform rule restricted on this domain.
All characterization results obtained for Pareto e cient deterministic rules : R N ! X(N k ) that divide a perfectly divisible homogeneous commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences also hold for probabilistic rules that assign indivisible identical objects to a set of strictly risk-averse agents with single-peaked preferences. Since the marginal distributions of the uniform probabilistic rules in Section 4 only depend on the peak pro le, we de ne these rules in the same way in the current context for pro les of utility functions.
Corollary 1 (Kureishi, 2000) When each agent is a strictly risk averse vNM-expected utility maximizer, the uniform probabilistic rules are the only probabilistic rules satisfying Pareto e ciency, strategy-proofness, and equal treatment of equals. Since equal treatment of equals is implied by either anonymity or no-envy, in Corollary 1 we can replace equal treatment of equals either by anonymity (Sasaki, 1997) or by no-envy.
